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Summary : This contribution brings to light an original artificial life simulation of strategic 
bargaining behaviors within a biotech cluster. It shows that bargainings involving firms and 
local institutions lead to an agreement which is not a perfect share but a compromise 
frequently hiding complex mecanisms of “greedy” strategies and concessions. Indeed, the 
performance of the cluster is maintained in the time due to the fact of the presence of local 
institutions which “regulate” the cluster. So they are “power of the weak” carrier. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the nineties, researchers in economics and business administration take an active 
interest in the geographic proximity and in its contribution to competitive advantages and 
collective performance within local spaces involving clustered firms. Surveys of the literature 
put in a prominent position the international nature of such an industrial phenomenon and the 
great importance given to it by regional industrial policies such as in the Silicon Valley in the 
United States, in the Medicon Valley on the Denmark and Sweden border, or as another 
example in the Chilean wine clusters (Malmberg and Maskell, 1999 ; Belussi and Arcangeli, 
1999 ; Lundvall and Maskell, 2000 ; Waluszewski, 2004; Giuliani and Bell, 2005…). The 
notion of geographical cluster here concerns more particularly a group of companies and 
institutions linked by commonalities, complementarities and geographical proximity, 
characterized by a high degree of specialisation and technological transfer. This active interest 
in this notion is today so high that the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) even considers clustering as a mondial economic phenomenon. By the way, on a 
conceptual point of view, these researches open a wide new reflexion on local capacities of 
innovation and collective performance within such local industrial organizations. In this 
perspective, this contribution presents an exploratory approach of clusters based on the 
evolutionary and strategic frameworks. 
By the way, if spatial and industrial theoric models, such as industrial districts or learning 
regions, offer a large analysis of coordination within clusters, they however not really take 
into account dispute dynamics, such as conflicts of bargaining and power, which can have 
some impacts on the performance and on the evolution of such local systems. Biotechnology 
clusters are here highly concerned as they are indeed based on the capacity of firms and local 
public institutions to solve their conflicting interests to keep on coordinations and collective 
performance. In this perspective, our purpose in this paper is to examine, on a exploratory and 
evolutionary heuristic point of view, in which conditions clusters can keep performance on 
the long run despite the conflictual or opportunist bargaining strategies developed by the 
agents involved. We more particularly presents an evolutionary model based on exploratory 
artificial life simulations involving firms and local public institutions which bargain to share a 
local collective resource using more or less sophisticated and opportunist strategies. As a 
result, the simulations show that local public institutions are “power of the weak” carrier and 
play a very important part in the cluster evolution and performance. So this contribution Page 3-25 
opens a new research way focused on an evolutionary analysis of strategic behaviors within 
biotech clusters. 
I.  AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON BARGAINING 
BEHAVIORS WITHIN BIOTECH CLUSTERS 
A.  BASIC DEFINITION OF INDUSTRY CLUSTERS 
Research literature presents a wide variety of cluster definitions. Historically, the cluster 
analysis finds its source in the Alfred Marshall “industrial atmosphere”, and has been next 
taken into account in the famous italian researches on industrial districts (citer). According to 
these conceptual approaches, a cluster is defined as a system of linked firms and institutions 
that reprensents a robust organisational form characterised by flexibility and based on 
collective trust facilitating exchanges, apprentissage and emulation. The main characteristic of 
this collective organization is that it reduces transaction costs and produces positive 
externalities, both technological and financial. In other respects, clusters are to be put in the 
same category as “local milieux”  (Crevoisier and Maillat, 1991; Camagni, 2003), as « local 
productive systems » (Garofoli, 1992) or as « new industrial spaces » (Scott, 1988), focused 
on local collective learning processes and economic regulation. By the way, business 
administration research, as well as that of economics, largely focuses attention on industrial 
clusters (Porter, 1998 ; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999 ; Floysand and Jakobsen, 2002 ;…). 
Wiser for the American experiences, Porter (1998) defines a cluster as « a geographically 
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions (universities, 
standard agencies and trade associations) in particular fields, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities”. So as it is shown by Carbonara (2005), the key features characterizing 
clusters are namely : the geographical proximity of small and medium sized firms; a dense 
network of interfirms relationships which both cooperate and compete; a dense network of 
social relationships, based on face-to-face contacts; the existence of complementary 
competencies and skills; and a high degree of specialisation and technological transfer. 
Moreover, to these key features can be added, on the one hand the existence of trust relations 
that participate in the system performance, and on the other hand the diversity of local actors 
involved such as firms and institutions (universities, public research laboratories, business 
associations, devlopment agencies…). Performance refers here to how actors involved 
develop and intensify collaborations with mutually beneficial effects (Tambunan, 2005). By Page 4-25 
the way, the performance of such clusters depends on the ability of the actors involved to 
coordinate, ie to agree on common rules of conduct without creating locked-in situations. 
B.  NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION AT STAKE WITHIN 
BIOTECH CLUSTERS 
Biotech clusters are developed in many parts of the world and are to be high considered in the 
european economic policy. The main particularity of these clusters in Europe and in France is 
that they are companies driven but as well, on a certain point of view, local governments 
driven. Local governments indeed attempt to create conditions which encourage the formation 
and growth of clusters, but of course without forgetting clusters are fondamentaly business 
driven. As an example, local governments participate in the search of public financings, they 
enhance the image of the cluster and they try to reinforce its attractivity (with start-up 
development, venture-capital captation, creation of regional incubators, creation of  networks 
between several national or international biotech clusters…). 
On a business point of view, biotech companies benefit from sharing knowledge about best 
practices and reduce costs by jointly sourcing services and suppliers. So biotech clusters are 
founded on frequent interactions and collaboration between institutions and firms with 
complementary assets and skills. The latter produce an attraction power that create a pool of 
skilled labour. Based on local resources mutualisation and on technical competences 
exchange, a biotech cluster is indeed characterized by a strong connectivity between firms on 
the one end, and between firms and local institutions, such as public research laboratories and 
local governments, on the other hand. This strong connectivity between actors leads to the 
emergence of external economies and “quasi-rents” due to competitive advantages and licence 
exploitation (Klein, Crawford, Alchian, 1978). 
But if literature is mainly focused  on cluster successes, only a few works put in a prominent 
position the question of development curbings and lock-in due to the opportunistic strategies 
or conflictual relations within the clusters. Conflict is indeed more developed than one could 
imagine because of the sharing of collective benefits at stake. A previous study (Leroux, 
2004) shows that biotech actors are use to be divided by three main types of conflicts : 
-  Conflicts to share information rents : mutualisation of producting and researching 
means suppose a mutualisation of information (activity, private financings, business 
purposes). Some agents sometimes try to play a “free-rider” strategy consisting in Page 5-25 
capturing these opportunistic rents to the detriment of the others (Cohendet and 
Llerena, 1999). 
-  Conflicts for knowledge appropriation : cooperation between firms for knowledge 
transfer can leads to an unequal capture of knowledge externalities (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
-  Conflicts to share and capture financings and mutual benefits : if an asset resulting 
from a cooperation between several firms is highly specific or patent protected, it can 
be a source of competitive advantage producing a monopoly rent. So some firms 
could try to capture it to the detriment of the others. 
In this perspective, the multipolar relationships within the bioclusters are characterized by a 
conjunction of these potentially conflictual strategies that are helped by uncertainty, rivalry, 
and the wide variety of the actors involved. So the resolution of these conflicts is at stake 
within biotech clusters because it can at every moment leads to relationship ruptures, 
production lateness or lock-in. Consequently, as a previous work shows it (Leroux, 2004), 
negotiation and bargaining play a real significant part in the cluster surviving, as a process of 
compatibility construction. By the way, if firms and institutions bargain for resources and 
rents sharing, they try at the same time to instrumentalise power relations using different and 
opportunistic collusive means. So the cluster performance and surviving on the long run will 
depend on the capacity of such agents to find agreements beyond their conflicting interests. 
So on a theorical point of view, the cluster notion has to be defined not as a structure but as a 
complex system taking into account the dynamic and evolutionary coordination processes 
involved. Surviving of such clusters depends on the strategic behaviors of firms and 
institutions characterized on the long run by different purposes, temporalities and needs. In 
this perspective, our purpose is to investigate this subject that is not recurrent within the 
literature. The latter is indeed focused on cognitive approaches about technological transfer 
but not on evolutionary strategic behaviors that can call into question the cluster performance. 
In this perspective, we offer a new research way that consists in modelling strategic 
evolutionary behaviors taking into account exchanges and communication between agents. So 
an artificial life simulation is an original tool to investigate behavioral dynamics within 
clusters. Page 6-25 
C.  TOWARDS AN EVOLUTIONARY SIMULATION OF BARGAINING 
BEHAVIORS WITHIN BIOTECH CLUSTERS 
Simulations are part of the works carried out in the field of Artificial Life, which substitutes 
the problematic of the emergence of collective regularity in a complex environment with the 
traditional problematic of static equilibrium. So simulations are considered as a right tool to 
model strategic behaviors within clusters, defined within this framework as complex 
evolutionary systems involving heterogeneous agents. They indeed contribute to introduce 
« variability » of behaviors on one hand, and they bring to light emergence of « newness » 
within these complex systems in evolution on the other hand (Arthur, Durlauf, Lane, 1997). 
Consequently, Artificial Life can contribute to better understanding clusters dynamics 
because it takes into account complexity of behaviors when agents are numerous and 
heterogeneous. More precisely, this is a way to grasp which behavioral characteristics are 
fundamental or recurrent, and among these latter which can be perceptible at a global level as 
an “emergence regularity”. So it becomes possible to catch emergence of isolable behavioral 
regularities stemed from interaction between firms and local institutions on one part, and from 
complex contextual and individual reasonings on the other part : appropriation strategies, 
capability to observe strategies of the others, capabilities to evaluate collective benefits. By 
the way, contrary to the approaches centered on static equilibrum, data-processing modelling 
of biotech clusters allows the analysis of behavioral dynamics and phases. 
On an epistemic point of view, this is an institutionalist approach based on an hayekian 
perception of social interaction. This epistemic posture rests on the darwinian natural 
selection and emphasizes evolutionary learning processes. On a theorical point of view, this 
approach is affiliated to the cognitive economics (Simon, 1955; Walliser, 2000), based on the 
following precepts : 1) variability, that corresponds to the endogeneous capability of the 
system to produce new directions depending on behavioral mutations of the agents involved ; 
2)  path dependency that results from learning effects and auto-reinforcement mecanisms 
leading to the irreversibility of the cluster evolutionary dynamics; 3) inductive learning, 
according to which agents are individually involved in a cognitive process of problems 
solving. They learn and adapt themselves with experience in a complex evolving system; 4) 
situated rationality  inspired from Simon (1955) work and taken up by Walliser (2000), 
concerning a rationality that is constructed throught interaction and that involves rationally 
adaptative agents. Page 7-25 
And on a methodological point of view, simulations are taken up in a purely exploratory 
perspective. The objective is to produce artifacts for heuristic purpose and to call into 
question the classical assumption of the representative agent (Marney and Tarber, 2000). This 
approach so consists in investigating a metaphoric world to make emerge new empirical and 
theorical questionnings and avenues of research. 
II.  THE MODEL 
A.  INTERACTION WITHIN THE BIOTECH CLUSTERS AND “STATE OF 
THE WORLD” 
Starting from the empirical established facts applied to biotech clusters, this model consists in 
Artificial Life simulations of local bargaining games involving heterogeous agents. More 
precisely, these are simulations of bargaining behaviors involving firms and local public 
institutions (local governments), which bargain to share a collective resource, such as a quasi-
rent, represented in the model by a pie. By the way, this is a Nash game under ultimatum 
inspired from the Ellingsen (1997) bargaining evolutionary game : when the two transactors 
involved want both to appropriate an over-large part of the pie, using opportunistic means, the 
negotiation fails. Two kinds of transactors take place in the model, as a state of the world : 
-  firms are modeled as “obstinate agents” whose demands are independent of those of 
the adversaries. As they participate in the cluster performance they want to 
appropriate the part of the pie that they fixed themselves depending on their 
profitability objectives. Some of them expect for a large part (more than 50 %) 
whereas the others expect for a less important part (less than 50 %). The part 
expected depends as well on the more or less powerful and opportunistic behaviors 
adopted by these firms. 
-  local public institutions (local communities) are modeled as “sophisticated agents” 
which adapt their demand to that hoped for of their adversaries rather than gain 
nothing. As they answer for the “general interest”, they adapt themselves to the firms 
expectations. The stake is here to fix firms in the cluster, to avoid relocations, to 
impulse research innovation links, new employments and territorial performance. So 
they are under firms’ ultimatum because the latter sometimes make relocation or 
employment blackmails to capt public financings or to obtain more advantages. 
When two local public institutions bargain together, they share the pie in a 50 /50 Page 8-25 
proportion in respect to the “general interest” and to their common stake : local 
development and performance. 
The originality of this model is due to the introduction of a “relationship proximity” linking 
some agents in this artificial world. So if firms and institutions can bargain with every agent 
within the cluster, they however exchange information on the pie size only with partners that 
they have noted they had adopted the same strategy as them during the bargaining phase. 
Consequently, if certain agents are not able to recognize ex-ante the strategy of their 
adversary, they are nevertheless able to know it at the end of the bargaining process. So 
depending on the bargaining process and pay-off, they know if they can trust and exchange 
information with their partner. 
Starting from this model structure, the purpose is here to test the outcomes of bargainings 
under different situations. In this perspective, we develop three simulations based on a genetic 
algorithm (Goldberg, 1989). The simulation number one (S1) models the behaviors of firms 
and institutions when the pie size is known. The simulation number two (S2) models the 
behaviors of theses agents when the pie size is unknown, introducing uncertainty in the game. 
And the third simulation (S3) models their behaviors when the pie size varies depending on 
the bargainers’ behavior. So will the bargainings between firms and local public institutions 
lead to a perfect share ? Will the results change if the pie size is unknown or if the pie size 
evolves and depends on the bargaining behaviors of the transactors involved ? Which is the 
part played by local public institutions in the game ? And how does the cluster performance 
evolve according to the bargaining behaviors of the agents involved ? 
The main interest of these simulations is that they are part of a cognitive approach centered on 
perception/ reasoning/ decision-making (Haton and Haton, 1993) Perception refers to the 
mechanisms used to acquire information which will give the agents a specific representation 
of the environment at a given time. Reasoning refers to learning mechanisms which enable 
individual behaviors to be adjusted depending on the state of the environment, i.e. depending 
on the information received. Finally, decision-making shows the outcome of reasoning, i.e. 
the deliberate choice of an action. It is a question of using a heuristic research process so as to 
solve a specified problem, the simulation giving agents the ability to explore and assess 
possible actions within a changing environment. The simulation is technically made on the 
basis of implementing evolution operators, such as crossover and mutation, which make it 
possible for aggregate behaviors said to be "intelligent" to emerge. Page 9-25 
B.  DEMAND DETERMINATION 
1.  Firms demand 
The obstinate firm’s demand di is broken out into two components : the size of the pie 
expected for and the portion demanded. Thus :  
di = expected size of the pie (teg) * demanded portion (i) 
with 
T : the real size of the pie 
teg ∈ [0,TG], minimum value and maximum value of teg 
i ∈ I ⊂ [0,1], I set of the portions demanded 
of which 
di ∈ D ⊂ [0,TG], D D finite set of possible demands. 
The strategy di with i = 0.5 is called "fair strategy". Any strategy for which i > 0.5 is 
called "greedy strategy". And the other strategies for which i < 0.5  are called modest 
strategies. 
 
2.  Institutions demand 
Institutions, whose strategies are called r, are supposed to identify the adversary's strategy 
and adapt their demand to the demand expected for of the adversary. Consequently, when an 
institution bargains with a firm whose demand is di, it demands : 
r = tegr-di 
Nevertheless, institutions can also be put into a situation of failure if they overestimate the 
size of the pie. So the set of possible strategies is S = D U {r}, with di the obstinate 
demand and r the sophisticate demand. 
C.  PAY-OFF FUNCTION 
If firm i asks for di and firm j asks for dj, then firm i receives the following pay-off : 
0.5  0  1 
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If the total of di and dj is greater than the real size of the pie T, then the bargaining has failed 
and neither firm obtains any gain. The surpluses are not redistributed and are considered as 
lost. By the way, an institution that meets a firm thus obtains : 
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teg 2 r 1 r 1 r
2 r 1 r ≤
+
= Π  
So the following pay-off matrix is obtained: 
 
Table 1. The pay-off matrix 












D.  SIMULATIONS 
1.  Implementation of the genetic algorithm 
Simulations are based on a genetic algorithm supported by a darwinian optimizing fonction 
(Holland, 1975). Each agent, firm or institution, is determined by its “genotype” broken out 
into two components : its strategy and the expected for size of the pie. The whole population 
consists of 1000 agents and the initial size of the pie is equal to 1. The obstinate population 
(the firms involved) is divided into seven profiles which correspond to seven discreet 
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Table 2. The seven obstinate profiles 
Obs 7  Firms whose demand is 7 % 
Obs 21  Firms whose demand is 21 % 
Obs 35  Firms whose demand is 35 % 
Modest 
Obs 50  Firms whose demand is 50 %  Fair 
Obs 64  Firms whose demand is 64 % 
Obs 78  Firms whose demand is 78 % 
Obs 92  Firms whose demand is 92 % 
Greedy 
 
Each simulation is held according to the following steps  : 1) Initialisation  : randomly or 
deliberative choice of strategies; 2) Notation : bargaining process and notation, ie assessment 
of each agent in function of the gains he can generate; 3) Selection : process through which 
agents are chosen to be replicated, the most favored being those with the highest level of 
notation; 4) Crossover : crossover and reproduction of the most successful agents; 5) 
Mutation : randomly deterioration of one or several genetic characters of an agent; 6) Return 
to 1. 
By the way, this model is based on the following parameters : the initial size of the pie is 1; 
the pie can vary according to the interval [0,1 ; 2,0]; the number of agents within the 
population is 1000; the mutation rate is 10 %; the crossover rate is 50 %; the initial 
distribution of the different populations involved (Obs and Soph) at the start of the game is 
12,5 %. In a cluster, agents don’t systematically bargain with the whole population, but only 
with some agents when necessary. Consequently, this constraint has been introduced in the 
model : at each bargaining an agent bargains with 10 % of the whole population. Each agent 
is next assessed in function of the gains he can generate. As to the simulations S1, S2 and S3, 
they have been carried out 1000 times. 
2.  Relationship proximity 
A modelling of what we call “relational proximity” is introduced in the crossover process. If 
firms and institutions are paired off and bargain with every type of adversary (notation step), 
they next nevertheless don’t exchange information with a partner whom they have observed 
adopting a different strategy during the bargaining (crossover step). So it consists in an 
endogeneous creation of relationship proximity which links agents in a common mutual Page 12-25 
selfprotection strategy : selective exchange of information on the pie size between agents that 
have the same strategic approach of exchange. 
3.  Simulation S1 : the size of the pie is known 
In this first simulation, companies and institutions bargain as they perfectly know the size of 
the quasi-rent, affiliated to the pie, from the start. The size of the pie is T=1 and doesn’t 
change during the bargainings. Let’s remind here that firms are not concessionary and don’t 
adapt themselves to the strategy of their adversary. On the contrary, institutions are 
concessionary. In this perspective, how will their behaviors evolve ? Will the agents involved 
adopt a perfect share of the pie ? Or will they try to capture the pie to the detriment of the 
others ? Will do emerge new conflicting or powering behaviors ? 
Resorting to a simulation allows us to observe step by step the strategies adopted by the 
agents involved and the eventual trending changes on 500 periods. At the start of the game, 
the different populations are equally divided into 8 subpopulations of firms “the obstinated” 
(Obs 7, …, 92) and institutions “the sophisticated” (Soph) such as in the Ellingsen model. In 
this way, no population is over-determining. On a technical point of view, the evolutionary 
algorithm is not entirely used – no crossover – due to the fact that the pie size is known. 
4.  Simulation S2 : the size of the pie is unknown 
In this second simulation, uncertainty is introduced into the bargaining game. The pie size is 
not known and the agents have to try to estimate it. The main interest of a such simulation is 
that no agent has a perfect lisibility of the collective surplus, and uncertainty is high. So will 
they reduce their ambition on the pie sharing ? Will they modulate this ambition according 
first to their evaluation of profits and second to the errors made during these evaluations ? 
Will conflict emerge and with which acuity ? Thus this simulation allows on one hand to 
estimate the global capacity of the cluster to “survive” through the time, and on the other hand 
to analyse which strategies are to be the most recurring. 
The size of the pie is fixed at T=1. Firms and institutions are here endowed with an 
endogeneous capacity to modify their respective demands d.More precisely, they estimate 
the size of the pie thanks to a learning process of teg,based on the use of evolutionary 
operators such as crossover and mutation. Each agent is indeed endowed with an evaluation 
capacity of what he expects for to be the size of the pie (teg). Consequently, each new 
evaluation leads to a change of the demand d. Page 13-25 
In addition, this exploration capacity relates to the potential values of the pie size, not only 
around the teg values (local research), but as well around what we call “unknown zones” 
(global research). The agents involved are indeed lead to estimate with the most significant 
precision what they think to be the real size of the pie. 
Nevertheless, they can be led to overestimate or to underestimate the size of the pie during the 
evaluation process. So the “winners” will be those who succeeded with estimating the size of 
the pie as soon as possible without making errors, and who exchanged information with the 
most successful agents. 
5.  Simulation S3 : the size of the pie varies depending on agents’ behavior 
As we have evoked it previously, clusters are basically conditioned by the capacity of the 
actors involved to lead to acceptable compromise and to solve their conflicting interests. Each 
negotiation has indeed a cost : as an example the cost generated by the time spent to negotiate 
(Ellingsen, 1997); the cost generated by the time spent to estimate the pie size or to observe 
the strategies adopted by the adversaries; or as well the cost due to the emergence of 
irreducible conflicts if too many agents choose to exerce a greedy strategy. In a situation 
characterized by uncertainty on the pie size, these behaviors that can be “opportunistic” 
qualified, are likely to call considerably in question the viability of the cluster.  
In this perspective, the simulation S3 takes into account the impact of bargaining behaviors on 
the pie size. The more firms and institutions are brought to choose behaviors leading to the 
failure of the negotiations, the greater the negative impact on the global performance of the 
cluster and thus on its viability in time (the size of the pie decreases). A contrario, the more 
the agents are led to choose behaviors supporting the success of negotiations (as concessions, 
or fair vs modest strategies), the more positive the impact on the global performance of the 
cluster (the size of the pie increases). In this way, which will be the behaviors mainly adopted 
by the firms and the institutions ? Which will be the impacts about it on the performance of 
the cluster ?  How will be organized the powership relations between agents ? 
Technically, a parameter of influence k is here affected with the real size T of the pie.  As the 
figure shows it below, if at the preceding step (n-1) the number of successful bargainings is 
higher than the number of the failures, then the size of the pie increases by 0.01. In the 
opposite case, it decreases by 0.01. The choice of this parameter k=0.01 is arbitrary and 
fixed at a low level. Indeed, it has vocation to illustrate that the failure of bargainings 
influences the cluster performance but in a nonradical way, as opposed to what could induce a Page 14-25 
strong economic crisis or the closing of a donor-of orders company.  In these last two cases, 
the performance of the cluster can be radically destroyed, which is not our case here. 




















III.  RESULTS 
A.  SIMULATION S1 
This first group of simulations (S1) consists in testing the evolution of bargaining behaviors 
when the size of the pie is known and doesn’t change. The simulations show that bargaining 
behaviors evolve in two distinct phases. First, local institutions making concessions are 
supreme to the other transactors during the first tweenty generations. During these periods, 
bargainings lead mainly to an equal share of the pie (50/50). Second, this supremacy of local 
institutions which make concessions then allows the emergence of the greedest firms, which 
demand is 92 % of the pie, and a low proportion of firms which demand is 78 % of the pie. 
It is important to note that  bargaining is in the medium and long terms stabilized around a 
majority of greedy firms whose existence is maintained due to the presence of local 
institutions playing concessions. So without uncertainty on the pie size, the greedest firms 
take advantage due to the redistributive part of local institutions. We can here conclude that 
                                                 
1 The « ranking selection » consists at first in classifying the agents by decroissant order according to their 
capacity to generate profits.  Thus, the most powerful agent has a note equal to 1000 and the least powerful has a 
note equal to 1.  Then, a random pulling is next carried out. Page 15-25 
institutions play indirectly, indeed non deliberately, a regulator role : as making concessions 
they contribute to allow the greedest firms to capt quasi-rents to the detriment of the modest 
and fair firms. So they are “power of the weak” carrier in that sense that the greedest firms are 
maintained due to their presence in the game. Without institutions making concessions, the 
greedest firms couldn’t take advantage of the situation. 



































B.  SIMULATION S2 
The second group of simulations (S2) consists in testing the evolution of bargaining behaviors 
when the size of the pie is unknown, giving rise to uncertainty. So the possibility of failure is 
stronger. After a thousand tests, the results show the existence of a plurality of possible 
outcomes : 
-  In 46,20 % of cases, the bargaining is stabilized around the greedest firms, which 
demand is 92 %, and the local institutions. Their existence in the game is maintained 
due to the presence of these local institutions, such as in S1. 
-  In 29,6 % of cases, the bargaining is stabilized around firms, which demand is 
weither 78 % or 64 %, and the local institutions. 
-  In 22,40 % of cases, the bargaining is stabilized around the fair firms, which demand 
is 50 % of the pie, and the local institutions. Page 16-25 
-  In 1 % of cases, the bargaining is stabilized around the modest firms which demand 
less than 35 % of the pie, and the fair firms. In these very rare cases, local public 
institutions are going missing. 
-  The last 0,8 % concern errors or accidents of the evolutionary process that can 
sometimes occur. 
So when the pie size is unknown, results can be very different and depend on the capacity of 
agents involved to find quickly the right size of the pie and to appropriate it. In the most 
recurring cases, such as in the figure n° 5 below, the greedest firms find it rapidly benefiting 
from a very large presence of local institutions during the first fourty periods or generations. 
This very large presence of institutions is due to the pie size researching process : concessions 
facilitate right evaluations, such as modest and fair firms whose low demands contribute to 
avoid failure. The other cases contribute to put in a prominent position emergence of prudent 
strategies consisting in revisiting demands downwards. Concessions appear en masse at the 
start of the period and then give way to more prudent obstinate strategies once the size of the 
pie is approximately estimated. So when the pie size is unknown, the regulator part of 
institution is very high. By the way, in only 1 % of cases modest firms can survive without 
local institutions because they themselves play a redistributive part. 
So we conclude that if the pie size is unknown the cluster can survive if there are enough local 
institutions to provide the pie redistribution or if the firms adopt a very modest behavior. So 
here as well, institutions and modest firms are “power of the weak” carrier in that sense that 
the greedest firms are maintained due to their presence in the game. Without institutions 
making concessions or without very modest firms, the greedest firms couldn’t take advantage 
of the situation. 
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Figure 6. Average results on 1000 generations 
Equilibre entre obstinés et sophistiqués sur 1000 évolutions

















Erreur Obs 7 Obs 21 Obs 35 Obs 50 Obs 64 Obs 78 Obs 92 Autre
équilibre
 
C.  SIMULATION S3 
The third group of simulations (S3) consists in testing the evolution of bargaining behaviors 
when the size of the pie varies depending on previous bargaining behaviors. In other term, we 
test the impact of bargaining behaviors on the cluster performance, which is represented here Page 18-25 
by the pie size. As explained previously, the pie increases (decreases) by 0,01 if the number 
of successes is higher (lower) than the number of failures in each period. 
The results show that agents adapt their behavior according to the maintain of the pie size. As 
the game is not stabilized, one thousand periods are represented here. They put in a prominent 
position that firms are led to exploit the bargaining process according to their evaluation of 
the pie size, its evolution, and the more or less important presence of institutions and 
modest/fair firms. Thus, once the pie has reached a size near the maximum threshold 
expected, the move from fair/modest strategy to the greedest strategy can be successively 
observed. As an example, the periods [275; 375] are caraterized by a strong presence of the 
very modest firms which demand is 21 %. During this period, modest behaviors contribute 
largely to make the pie growing towards the maximum threshold. Once the pie has reached 
this size, we can observe the move from the modest 21 % strategy to the greedest 92 % 
strategy. And this can be possible due to the presence of the institutions which appear to play 
their regulator part : reducing conflict between the greedest agents so as to avoid any radical 
reduction of the collective performance. So when the cluster is threatened due to the too 
important presence of greedy behaviors, which can considerably alter the global performance, 
local public institutions appear and play a regulator part allowing the pie growth. By the way, 
the cluster performance is maintained due principally to institutions, and in some cases to 
modest firms. Here as well, they are “power of the weak” carrier. Page 19-25 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
This model thus brings to light a first reflexion on dynamics and phases of behaviors within a 
biotech cluster characterized by a strong presence of local institutions. In this way, the 
evolutionary approach contributes to put in a prominent position that bargainings do not 
systematically lead to a perfect division of the pie (50/50). The simulations show that agents 
collectively modulate their behavior through time according to various parameters:  the profits 
withdrawn during the bargainings; the effects of their own behavior on the global 
performance of the cluster;  the uncertainty;  their capacity to observe their partners’ strategies Page 20-25 
and to make concession; and the existence of relational proximity ie the choice to exchange or 
not to exchange information according to the previous negotiation process. Whereas many 
models of clustering are focused on positive coordinations, the way is here opened on the 
dynamic modelling of strategic behaviors within complex environments. So the assumption of 
agents’ homogeneity is replaced by the assumption of agents’ heterogeneity along with 
different relationships and strategies of appropriation.  
By the way, this model leads to substitute the assumption of « situated rationality » for the 
assumption of « limited rationality  » (Simon, 1955 ; Walliser, 2000). This is a significant  
advance to understand the way that behaviors evoluate through the time. The behaviors of 
such heterogeneous agents indeed differ from those of the optimization approach developed 
by the othodoxe theory, that refers to the “homo-oeconomicus” principe. Here, this model 
takes into consideration the environmental factors and is able not only to evaluate them but as 
well to adapt itself to them. This adaptation more particularly depends on the agents’ 
representation of the environment evolution. So in this case, rationality is not fixed ex-ante 
but it is an outcome of collective action.  
Another contribution of this model is to bring to light the evolution of power relationships, 
more particularly the «  power of the weak  » carried by institutions. It makes possible to 
observe step by step how the agents “instrumentalise” their power relationships in a complex 
environment. If most previous researches on clusters develop analysis of knowledge transfer 
within rivalry situations, they however don’t develop analysis of conflicts due to the sharing 
of benefits on one hand, and to the different strategies adopted by the agents involves on the 
other hand. So this model calls into question that “rivalry-cooperation” systematically 
produces emulation. It can also leading to conflicts that agents have to solve to keep collective 
performance. 
Artificial life simulations indeed contribute to correct these inconsistances and put in a 
prominent position the regulating part of institutions, that are “power of the weak” carrier. So, 
if institutions regulate the system when the latter is threatened, they however indirectly 
contribute to the emergence of the greedest strategies. So this model makes emerge one of the 
main ambiguities of coordination within biotech clusters : on one part, they are supported by 
local governments because of the uncertainty depending on the firms’ behaviors (in situations 
characterized by relocalisation blackmails; closing firms blackmails…) and on the 
environment evolution. And on a another part, supporting firms can in some cases contribute 
to the emergence of the greedest strategies and to the ousting of the less opportunist firms. Page 21-25 
And finally, these simulations show that the cluster’ performance, that is here represented by 
the pie size, is not fixed ex-ante but evoluates depending on the behaviors and the strategic 
choices made by the agents involved. At each moment, some “accidents” of the system 
evolution, viewed as artifacts, can considerably affect the composition of the cluster. 
Consequently, this model offers a first attempt to formalize the notion of performance. 
Admittedly it needs to go deeper into the modelling reflexion. By the way, this is a first 
avenue of research that opens a way to the analysis of the cluster’ conditions of perenniality. 
For the first time, a bond is directly established between behavioral considerations and their 
impact on the cluster performance. 
On an exploratory point of view, such a model with a heuristic aiming opens new theoretic 
and empirical research ways. On a theoric point of view, it can lead to a reflexion focused on 
conflicting and power analysis within clusters, according to an evolutionary approach. 
Beyond the “rivalry-cooperation” relationships within clusters, how do the behavioral rules 
emerge and evoluate through time ? Do they produce an impact on the cluster performance on 
one part, and on the cluster surviving on the other part ? So these questionnings suppose the 
cluster not to be analysed according to a structuralist perspective. It needs to be analysed  
according to an evolutionary and processual perspective that can be characterized by different 
and numerous contingencies. On an empirical point of view, it seems to be interesting to 
develop analysis of concrete cases focused on conficts at stake within biotech clusters such as 
: the nature of conflict; the different solving processes adopted by the local actors involved 
and depending on environmental constraints (market, legal regulation…); and finally the 
impacts on the system evolution. In addition, if literature takes into account firms’ strategies, 
it doesn’t really develop reflexions about the part played par local governments within biotech 
clusters. However it is very significant especially within biotech clusters that are largely 
supported by local institutions and public financings. Here, an empirical research avenue is 
opened, that can be, as an example, focused on the ambivalences of the local governments’ 
part in the governance of such clusters. 
But if these heuritic simulations lead to new research matter, they however include 
methodological limits. As a first limit, the model develops only two kinds of agents, firms on 
one hand and institutions on the other hand. So it needs to be enlarged, taking into account a 
greater diversity of agents (research laboratories, development agencies,…), a greater 
diversity of exchanges (sellers-suppliers, …). Second, such a model is limited to relationships 
developed within the cluster. So it is important to take into account a more complex Page 22-25 
environment including the embedness of the actors involved in complex social relations 
outside the cluster (relations with donors-of orders; with shareholders; european policies…). 
The questionning is here focused on the various levels of decision and their impact on the 
cluster performance and surviving. And the third limit of the model is that it doesn’t introduce 
proximity as a distance, but as a relational and communicative one. In this perspective, our 
purpose is now to introduce geographical distance. Consequently, new computing tools such 
as MAS (MultiAgents Systems) can contribute to reinforce the mecanisms of inductive 
reasoning, while introducing geographic proximity parameters. MAS can be good tools to 
investigate complex phenomenons, such as lock-in and intrinsic vulnerability of biotech 
clusters. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As a result, the three simulations show that bargainings between firms and local institutions 
within the biotech cluster lead to an agreement which is not a perfect share but a compromise 
frequently hiding complex mecanisms of more or less greedy strategies and concessions. 
Indeed, the performance of the cluster is maintained in the time due to the fact of the presence 
of local institutions, and sometimes very modest firms, which play a distributive part and 
which “regulate” the cluster. So they are “power of the weak” carrier. In this perspective these 
results bring to the fore the question of evolutionnary flexibility, dynamics of phases and 
power behaviors within biotech clusters. In this way, this model can contributes to open new 
researches focused on complex economic dynamics, collective performance and ambivalent 
power strategies according to the spatial industrial framework. 
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